Trust nucleus

Credential Vault

BYOK configuration shell with scopes, spend limits, and clear access boundaries. No secrets should be entered until encryption/storage is configured.

Prototype only. Do not paste real API keys into this release shell.
Prototype

Access boundaries

What each credential can touch

Prototype

This prototype makes the trust contract visible before storage exists: no raw key fields, no hidden provider access, and no mutation-capable credential without scope, spend, and audit context.

Switchboard provider pool

Prototype
Key status
No visitor keys stored
Spend limit
Foundation release cap: display-only. Enforcement backend is pending.
Access
Routes preview chat through approved low-cost provider adapters when backend routing is enabled.
Audit
Every future routed call must write provider, model, cost class, and surface origin to the action ledger.
Allowed surfaces
  • Hermes chat prototype
  • Switchboard status display
Blocked surfaces
  • Vault memory writes
  • billing mutations
  • external sends

No action needed. This is a system-provider posture preview.

User BYOK provider

Prototype
Key status
No raw secret input rendered
Spend limit
Per-provider monthly soft cap and hard kill switch are planned.
Access
Lets a signed-in user bind a provider key to specific Quill surfaces after encrypted storage is active.
Audit
Future view will show last used, token spend, enabled surfaces, and revocation history.
Allowed surfaces
  • Personal chat
  • RAG retrieval
  • developer API tests
Blocked surfaces
  • Public anonymous preview
  • other users' workspaces
  • agent training

Wait for encrypted vault storage before pasting any real credential.

Local model endpoint

Coming Later
Key status
Endpoint not connected
Spend limit
Local resource budget and health checks only.
Access
Reserved for local or 121-owned model interfaces without moving user data through hosted providers.
Audit
Must record endpoint identity, capability class, and data boundary before activation.
Allowed surfaces
  • Private workspace experiments
  • future owned-model interface
Blocked surfaces
  • Public chat
  • production API consumers
  • irreversible actions

No setup until the owned/local model interface is explicitly enabled.

Encrypted-at-rest credential storage before any raw key entry.

User-scoped row-level boundaries for every stored key.

Per-key capability cards that explain what the key can access.

Spend limits with soft warning and hard kill behavior.

Action ledger entries for key creation, use, disablement, and deletion.

Export/delete path that respects user sovereignty and app-store compliance.

Key storage

Requires encrypted storage and RLS-backed user boundary.

Coming Later
Scopes

Visible provider access boundaries are modeled above.

Prototype
Spend limits

Limit copy present; enforcement backend pending.

Prototype
Audit trail

Last-used and action ledger requires backend.

Coming Later